

# CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE EU: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES, THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

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


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#### **Success of transformation**


**GDP** dynamics, 1989=100





Most countries demonstrated growth, though there were distinct groups.

## After accession and crisis: generally better than Western Europe



Even the slowest growing CEECs grew faster than most of the fastest EU-17 MS. None of the CEECs noted a decline as deep as the worst EU-17 MS.

However, convergence to the West slower than before the crisis.

#### 2018 forecast



Map by the Economist, Source: European Commission

## Can it last forever? NO! Major challenges for the new Member States

The catching-up process was mostly based on **external** resources.

Innovativeness of the CEEC economies has not grown sufficiently.

External sources of international **competitiveness** are drying out, and internal potentials are still undeveloped.


The danger of disappearance of the **low-cost** types of production, weak new sources of competitive advantage.


**Demographic** challenge: low fertility rates, outmigration, aging societies, pressure on pension systems.


**Environmental** challenge: dependence on fossil fuels, heavy pollution, underdeveloped environmental infrastructure.

Caught in the "middle income trap". Can the membership and Cohesion Policy help them overcome it?

### **CEEC** weaknesses: demography









# CEEC weaknesses: dependance in technology imports

#### Employent share in low tech manufacturing







## **CEEC** weaknesses: low innovativeness




#### European Innovation Scoreboard 2016



For Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta, performance group membership is identical to that in the European Innovation Scareboard 2016 report.











### Dependance on transfers from the EU




## Regional patterns CEE GDP per capita 2014, euro



#### Absolute values




#### Country=100




### Regional growth, 2008-2014







### Country=100




### Convergence of countries, divergence within countires



Regional convergence, but....



Metropolisation - the strongest factor of divergence. Weakening?




Without the largest cities in some CEECs - weak convergence

#### Regional patterns, Poland



GDP per capita, 2014, NUTS3, Poland=100

Real GDP growth, 2010- 2014, NUTS3, Poland=111.7





#### The future of the CEECs in the EU


#### White Paper on the Future of Europe, March 2017

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white paper on the future of europe en.pdf

#### Priorities of the EU for the future:

- 1. Single market integration and trade (?).
- Monetary and economic union (Czech Rep., Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania out).
- 3. Migration and security (strong opposition in most).
- 4. Innovation and technological progress (weak absorption).
- Environmental protection and decarbonisation (Poland & Greece against)
- 6. Foreign and defense policy (rather positive, Poland sceptic).

## Share of non-nationals in the resident population, 1 January 2016 (%)




<sup>(1)</sup> Estimate



<sup>(\*)</sup> Provisional.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop1ctz)

### Attitudes towards refugees quota



### New targets for (smaller?) financing

- Less for:
  - regional development;
  - health care
  - labour market intervention
- More for:
  - innovation;
  - handling immigration;
  - environment (decarbonisation)
  - defence and security



#### **Scenarios for Europe**



- 1. Carrying on
- 2. Nothing but the single market\*)
- 3. Those who want more do more
- 4. Doing less more efficiently
- 5. Doing much more together
  - \*) plus the money

As a result: Europe of several speeds



## Institutional divergence, conservatism and social attitudes

Institutional convergence of the CEECs began after 1989.

It proceeded until 2003, mostly due to the phase of accepting the acquis communautaire along with the association phase.

Since 2003 the convergence process **slowed down** in all countries. Without external pressure own propensity for institutional improvements was low.


Recently – a reversal of institutional change.

One hypothesis: **closed societies** manipulated by "conservative" polititians

"Social psychology" of Cohesion Policy and the CAP: perception as "easy money" which we deserve by definition.

Priviliges without obligations.


#### The role of CEECs in the EU



- 1. CEE as a laboratory of change
- 2. In most cases successful economic transformation, though challenges mounting in the future
- 3. A diverse group more and less reliable members
- 4. But "bad boys" challenge EU prinicples and do not agree to join comon policies (Euro perhaps the most important)
- 5. Unfortunately Poland appears to be the "leader of the gang"
- 6. Also in some countries corruption is still a problem
- 7. Dramatic decrease of EU transfers possible and depending on agreements to various common policies
- 8. Polexit? Hunexit?
- 9. Hopefully not.



#### **Culture matters**



### Institutions, stupid!

Thank you for your attention

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